并购、合资前的知识产权评估

对于大型企业知识产权的价值性和重要性已经不用多说，如果说现在国内大型企业在引进外资时，不重视对自主知识产权的评估，有点求全责备了。但是国内的企业在与外资合作时，在知识产权方面还是屡屡中招，我们需要重新看待知识产权的评估。

关于知识产权的评估方式1989由四部委共同颁布的《关于企业兼并的暂行办法》确定了三种评估方式，1991国务院出台《国有资产评估管理办法》增加了一种评估方式，并且还预留了其他评估方法。我国知识产权的评估其实是符合国际惯例的，即采用国际通行的评估方法：成本法、市场法和收益法。知识产权的评估技术含量高、程序要求严格，知识产权的分类、评估对象和评估目的不同时，评估方法也不相同。我们不考虑评估受到人为的控制等现实存在的各种问题，假设这些评估过程是合法的、结果是确切的，但是这些评估方法对知识产权的评估显然是有缺陷的。

目前的评估方式仅仅是对知识产权进行静态的评估，得到的价值是对以前的的判断，而购买知识产权是为了未来长期的使用，当然不能仅仅依据过去某个静态的评估价值去购买。知识产权的价值是动态的，波动的幅度非常之大，而且具有非常大的不确定性，对于商标而言，其价值很可能在顷刻之间从数亿跌落到零，甚至是负数，我国已经有这样的实际案例，比如南京的“冠生园”因为使用了陈年的月饼馅，“冠生园”牌月饼让人们避之惟恐不及，那么其商标价值因为该事件几乎是瞬间跌为负数，还有众多的国际顶级品牌因为严重的质量问题被暴光，这些国际大品牌在国内的价值也因为暴光而大打折扣。而专利不确定性的因素更多，评估起来更是困难。

目前的评估主要由会计师事务所来完成，而对专利的评估需要很深的技术背景和专利方面的专业知识，会计师们仅仅依据会计准则评估出来的结果无法反映专利的真实价值。影响专利价值的因素非常之多，不具备专业技术以及专利专业知识是不可能理解的。比如某项专利的技术含量很高，具有非常广阔的市场前景，其价值当然会被评估很高，如果发现更先进的替代技术那么该专利的价值立刻贬值到很低。是不是很快就有更先进的替代技术，这需要对专利文献进行非常专业的检索和分析。还有的专利从各方面看起来都非常不错，可以评估很高的价值，但是其专利文件却写得很糟糕，几乎使这个专利的关键技术点完全不受保护（这种情况在我国比比皆是），那么这个专利的实际价值是零，这个判断需要相当的专利代理知识。还有的专利技术很容易被绕过，有的专利本身包含其他专利技术权利关系复杂等等都将影响专利的价值，而且不同行业的专利还需要不同的技术背景，这些技术背景是会计师事务所不可能具备的。

我们可以组合各专业的人才对知识产权进行全面的评估，得出最接近真实的价值，但是知识产权只有使用才能实现其价值，而且知识产权的价值巨大波动还和使用者具有很大的关系，价值再大的商标如果不注意维护，一次假冒伪劣可能就是致命的打击，甚至更为严重的后果，上面提到的南京“冠生园”陈年月饼馅事件直接导致了该公司的破产。专利没有使用好也可能被他人饶过，或者被人扎篱笆围困等等都将影响专利价值波动。这又是另一个专业问题——知识产权管理，本人在其他文章中有过讲述，这里不赘述。

以上的分析，在合资之前对知识产权的评估不能仅仅依据会计师事务所的评估，还需要专业知识产权律师参与，这样才能反映真正的知识产权价值，为自己在合资中赢得主动，使知识产权的价值得到维护和最大的发挥。

作者：王律师，中国知识产权研究会高级会员
电话：010-51662214，电子信箱：lawyerwy@263.net
个人网站：http://www.rjls.cn。


Chapter VII
Special Rules for Anti-dumping Disputes

OUTLINE

Section One Recourse of Anti-dumping Disputes to the DSB
I Introduction
II Sufficiency of Panel Request under the AD Agreement
(i) Art. 6.2 of the DSU and Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement
(ii) Art. 6.2 of the DSU and Article 17.5(i) of the AD Agreement
(iii) A Summary Guiding
III General Legal Basis for Claims against Legislation as Such
IV Special Rules for Claims against Anti-dumping Legislation as Such
(i) Introduction
（ii）General Legal Basis under Art. 17 of the AD Agreement
(iii) Understanding of Art. 17.4 of the AD Agreement
(iv) Extensive Basis in Context
(v) A Summary
Section Two Ad hoc Standard of Review for Anti-dumping Disputes
I Introduction
II Special Standard of Review under the AD Agreement: in General
(i) Ad hoc Approaches to Domestic Determination: Art. 17.6
(ii) Relationship between Art. 11 of the DSU and Art. 17.6 of the AD Agreement
(iii) A Summary Guiding
III Scope of Review of Fact-findings: Art. 17.5(ii) of the AD Agreement
(i)Overview of the GATT Practice
(ii)Concerned Rulings in Reports Issued by WTO Panels
(iii)Tentative Remarks: Guidance from the Appellate Body





Section One
Recourse of Anti-dumping Disputes to the DSB

I Introduction
Compared to the legally fragmented previous GATT dispute settlement system, the new WTO dispute settlement system is an integrated system with much broader jurisdiction and less scope for “rule shopping” and “forum shopping”. However, according to Art. 1.2 of the DSU which states in part that, “[t]he rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to this Understanding”, many covered agreements under the WTO jurisdiction continue to include special dispute settlement rules and procedures. Such special rules and procedures are listed in Appendix 2 to the DSU. And in this chapter, we will focus on such special dispute settlement rules concerning anti-dumping disputes, i.e. Arts. 17.4 through 17.7 of the Anti-dumping Agreement (‘the AD Agreement’).
An analysis of the DSB practice suggests a separate contribution of this chapter to this book, merited by dispute settlement proceedings in the anti-dumping field. In this chapter, the author focuses on the two main issues repeatedly raised, as preliminary or procedural issues, during dispute settlement regarding anti-dumping. One is the issue of recourse of anti-dumping disputes to the DSB, which deals mainly with Arts. 17.4 and 17.5(i) of the AD Agreement; the other one is the issue of standard of review in anti-dumping areas, which runs most on Art. 17.6, including Art. 17.5(ii), of the AD Agreement. And in this section we will focus on the first one. In this respect, Arts. 17.4 and 17.5(i) of the AD Agreement states:

“17.4 If the Member that requested consultations considers that the consultations pursuant to paragraph 3 have failed to achieve a mutually agreed solution, and if final action has been taken by the administering authorities of the importing Member to levy definitive anti-dumping duties or to accept price undertakings, it may refer the matter to the Dispute Settlement Body (“DSB”). When a provisional measure has a significant impact and the Member that requested consultations considers that the measure was taken contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article 7, that Member may also refer such matter to the DSB.
17.5 The DSB shall, at the request of complaining party, establish a panel to examine the matter based upon:
(i) a written statement of the Member making the request indicating how a benefit accruing to it, directly or indirectly, under this Agreement has been nullified or impaired, or that the achieving of the objectives of the Agreement is being impeded, and
(ii) …”
II Sufficiency of Panel Request under the AD Agreement
Generally, as noted in previously, it is only where the provisions of the DSU and the special or additional rules and procedures of a covered agreement cannot be read as complementing each other that the special or additional provisions are to prevail. A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them. Then the author means to get down to the issue of whether these provisions cited above limits panel request under the AD Agreement to somehow other than those required by Art. 6.2 of the DSU.
In Mexico-HFCS (DS132), the dispute involves the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping measure by the Mexican Ministry of Trade and Industrial Development (SECOFI) on imports of high-fructose corn syrup (HFCS) from the United States. Mexico argues that the United States' request for establishment of this Panel is not consistent with the requirements of Art. 6.2 of the DSU and Art. 17.4 and 17.5(i) of the AD Agreement, and therefore argues that the Panel must terminate the proceeding without reaching the substance of the United States' claims.
(i) Art. 6.2 of the DSU and Art. 17.4 of the AD Agreement
In considering the alleged failure to assert claims under Art. 6.2 of the DSU and Art. 17.4 of the AD Agreement, the Panel rules that: 1
“[W]e note first that the Appellate Body has stated that Article 6.2 of the DSU and Article 17.4 of the AD Agreement are complementary and should be applied together in disputes under the AD Agreement. It has further stated that: ‘the word “matter” has the same meaning in Article 17 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement as it has in Article 7 of the DSU. It consists of two element: The specific “measure” and the “claims” relating to it, both of which must be properly identified in a panel request as required by Article 6.2 of the DSU.’